

CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE
ROMAN LEGION.

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A
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INTO THE
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OF THE
ROMAN LEGION.

With some Observations on the MILITARY ART
of the ROMANS, compared with that of the
MODERNS.

EDINBURGH:

Printed by BALFOUR and SMELLIE,

M,DCC,LXXIII.



ROMA
of the ROMAN CAMP and of the
MODERN

EDITION
MCCCLXXII

To his GRACE
JOHN DUKE of ARGYLE,
BARON SUNDRIDGE, &c. &c.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF HIS MAJESTY'S
FORCES IN NORTH-BRITAIN,
AND COLONEL OF THE ROYAL REGIMENT
OF FOOT,

The following INQUIRY is humbly inscribed,

BY

His GRACE's

Much obliged and

Obedient humble Servant,

The AUTHOR.

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THE CHARGE

ARTIST'S EMBLEM
JOHN DEER OF ABERDEEN

BARON ALFRED DOUGLAS

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THE AUTHOR

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author of the following Inquiry, when in the field with the army, used, at vacant hours, and among other amusements, to compare the Military Art of the Ancients with that of the Moderns. Being thus led to examine some parts of the ancient historians more critically, than he had been formerly accustomed to do, he found the commentators frequently embarrassed in endeavouring to explain the battles, and other military operations of the Romans. This seemed to him to arise chiefly from an indistinct idea of the Legion. He, therefore, collected from these histories such passages as seemed most conducive to the illustration of this branch of antiquity. From these were deduced the following observations, in which the Author presumes to think, that some material circumstances in the Roman militia, hitherto unnoticed by the moderns, are laid open.

That this tract should now appear, after having been neglected and almost forgotten upwards of twenty years, was owing

to an accidental conversation with a friend, well known for his acquaintance with the antiquities and fine arts of Greece and Rome.

If these observations shall be found, in any degree, to throw light upon obscure passages in ancient histories, the Author will consider himself as amply rewarded.

SECTION I.
A CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
CONSTITUTION of the ROMAN
LEGION.

OF the numerous commentators on the Roman authors, there are few, if any, who have not endeavoured to explain the constitution of the Legion, either in whole, or in part; and yet there still remain difficulties not easy to be removed. The authors chiefly referred to on this subject are, POLYBIUS, TITUS LIVIUS, and VEGETIUS.

POLYBIUS, having had the best opportunities of knowing the Roman militia, and having been always esteemed a judicious and accurate author, merits the highest credit. From him we have a distinct account of the method of encamping, and of the order of the troops in marching out of, and into, the camp.

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He hath likewise described the disposition of the Legion, when in order of battle. But, soon after POLYBIUS's time, the Legion underwent a considerable change, both with respect to its numbers, divisions, and disposition, when in line of battle.

The passage of TITUS LIVIUS, relating to the Legion, is declared, by all the commentators, to be corrupted almost in every sentence, insomuch as scarcely to admit of correction; besides, though the Legion underwent different changes in different periods of the state, neither he nor VEGETIUS mention particularly to what period they refer.

The common account of the Legion by the modern authors, who have written on Roman antiquities, is, that it consisted of ten *cohorts*; each *cohort* of three *maniples*; and each *maniple* of two *centuries*. That, in order of battle, the Legion was disposed in three lines, distinguished by the names of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*; and that a *maniple* of each cohort was posted in each of the three lines. This is the general account of the Legion given by JUSTUS LIPSIUS: And the most part of the authors, who have written since LIPSIUS's time, have implicitly agreed with him.

SALMASIUS hath been more attentive than Lipsius to the changes which the Legion underwent. He observes, that its constitution under the CAESARS was not the same with that under

under the *Scipios*. But he hath neither taken notice of the gradual change which it underwent, nor of its different dispositions in line of battle. Besides, later authors, who have written on these subjects, as *Rosinus*, *Cantelius*, *Cnippingius*, *Kennet*, and others, have followed *Lipsius*, with little or no regard to *Salmasius*.

When we consider that *Titus Livius* lived one hundred and fifty years after *Polybius*, and near four hundred years before *Vegetius*, it is not surprising that these three authors do not agree in every circumstance relating to the Roman militia. The passage in *Titus Livius*, giving an account of the constitution of the Legion, is in the eight chapter of the eight book; and, as it stands in the text, may be translated thus. * ‘ What was, in former times, a continued line like the ‘ Macedonian *phalanx*, came afterwards to be divided into maniples, and, last of all, into more and smaller divisions. ‘ Each of these divisions consisted of sixty soldiers, two centurions,

* Quod antea phalanges similes Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies coepit esse. Postremo in plures ordines instruebantur. Ordo sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat. Prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim, distantes inter se modicum spatium: Manipulus leves videnos milites, aliam turbam scutatorum habebat. Leves autem, qui hastam tantum gaeaeque gererent, vocabantur. Haec prima frons in acie florem juvenum pubescentium ad militiam habebat. Robustior inde aetas, totidem manipulorum, quibus Principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur, scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis. Hoc triginta manipulorum agmen Antepilanos appellabant. Tit. Liv. lib. viii. cap. 8.

‘ turions, and one ensign-bearer. The *hastati* made the first
 ‘ line, and consisted of fifteen maniples, separated from each
 ‘ other by moderate spaces. The maniple had twenty light
 ‘ armed men belonging to it; the rest were heavy armed, and
 ‘ were called *scutati*. Those were named light armed, who
 ‘ carried only a spear and javeline. This first line contained
 ‘ the flower of the Roman youth. Those of a firmer and
 ‘ more advanced age, consisting likewise of fifteen maniples,
 ‘ and called *principes*, made the second line, remarkable for
 ‘ their arms, which were likewise heavy. Those who made
 ‘ up this body of thirty maniples, were called *antepilani*.’

Thus far TITUS LIVIUS, with respect to the first and second lines, which made the body of the Legion. The *triarii* were merely a body of reserve, as will appear afterwards.

Now, if we compare this account of T. LIVIUS, with that of VEGETIUS, it will appear that these two authors agree exactly with respect to the two first lines, when in order of battle: For the first cohort, according to VEGETIUS *, was posted on the right of the first line; and the four following cohorts, according to their seniority, completed that line; the third being

* *Acies peditum a prima cohorte incipit ordinari in cornu dextro: Huic cohors secunda conjungitur. Tertia cohors in media acie collocatur. Huic annectitur quarta. Quinta vero cohors sinistrum suscipit cornu.—Sed in secunda acie, dextro cornu cohors sexta ponebatur; cui jungebatur septima. Octava cohors mediam aciem tenebat, nona comitante. Decima cohors in secunda acie sinistrum semper obtinebat cornu. Veget. lib. ii. cap. 15.*

being in the middle, and the fifth on the left of the line. In like manner, the sixth cohort had its station on the right of the second line; the seventh on the left of the sixth; and so on, to the tenth cohort, which, being on the left, completed this line.

Thus, by the authority of these two authors, each of these lines contained fifteen maniples, or five complete cohorts. But it will be proper to remove the difficulties in this passage of T. LIVIUS, since LIPSIUS hath changed it almost in every sentence, to make it agree with the constitution and disposition of the Legion, as he had conceived them: And the other commentators have either adopted his corrections, or given it up as desperate.

It is said, that the lines were first arranged in maniples, but afterwards were disposed in more, and, consequently, in smaller divisions: If so, these divisions could be nothing but centuries. By *ordo*, then, in this passage, we are to understand century. The different meanings affixed to the same words have frequently proved the cause of uncertainty and confusion. The Roman military terms cannot always be defined with sufficient precision; thus, *acies* signifies either a line or division of an army, and sometimes a whole army. *Ordo* is used to express a file, a rank, a century, a maniple, and even a cohort; sometimes, it is used for a file of centuries or maniples, counting from the front to the rear of the three lines, which, by the

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moderns,

moderns, is known by the term *division*, as contra-distin-
guished from *line*. FRONTINUS, describing POMPEY'S dispo-
sition in *Pharsalia*, says, 'Cn. Pompeius adversus C. Caesarem
' Palaeopharali, triplicem instruxit aciem, quarum singulae de-
' nos ordines habebant in latitudinem *.' MODESTUS † de-
scribes every line of the Legion under the denomination of
ordo. The terms too, *manus*, *manipulus*, *cohors*, are used indis-
criminately by many authors, both historians and poets, to ex-
press any body of men. But, in the passage before us, *ordo* sig-
nifies a century, that being the only division in the Legion less
than a maniple.

' The *ordo*, (or century), says T. LIVIUS, contained sixty
' men, two centurions, and one ensign-bearer.' The author
tells us afterwards, that the Legion consisted of five thousand
foot. These numbers come out exact, according to the follow-
ing estimate.

Sixty centuries of sixty-three men each	3780
The <i>triarii</i> - - - - -	600
The light armed men belonging to thirty maniples, at twenty men each maniple	600
Superior officers not ranked in the centu- ries - - - - -	20
	<hr/>
	5000
	The

* Frontin. lib. ii. cap. 3. § 22. † De vocabulis rei militaris.

The superior officers may be supposed to have amounted to twenty, for there were ten tribunes, and the *legati*, prefects, eagle-bearers, &c. might make ten more. These different numbers, when added together, making up the integral number to which the author says the Legion amounted, is a proof that the text is thus far not corrupted. It may be observed, that, according to POLYBIUS, the *velites* amounted to a greater number than T. LIVIUS makes them in this passage. But their numbers, as well as their names, were different at different periods of the state.

That two centurions should be allotted to each century, hath made the commentators with one voice declare this a corruption of the text. But this is not surprising, since POLYBIUS says, that the officer who commanded the manipule had a substitute, whose post was on the left of that division : And we are told by another author, that the tribunes appointed an assistant to each centurion *. Hence T. LIVIUS uses the term *subcenturio*. It had formerly been in the power of the centurions, *decuriones*, and other officers, to chuse their substitutes, called *optiones* † : But the tribunes, from ambition, afterwards arrogated this privilege.

Thus,

* Optio qui nunc dicitur, antea appellabatur Accensus ; is adjutor dabatur centurioni a tribuno militum. Fest.

† Quos decuriones primo administratos ipsi sibi adoptabant, Optiones vocari coepti, quos nunc propter ambitionem tribuni faciunt. Varr.

Thus, the first and second lines of the Legion are explained by these two authors, agreeing with one another in every circumstance, and consistent with themselves; and yet this account is evidently different from that which is given by all those who have undertaken to explain the Roman militia.

The ten cohorts or thirty maniples being thus disposed in two lines, the remaining part of the Legion consisted of the *triarii*, and the irregulars, which latter, being a fluctuating body, took their post sometimes before, and sometimes behind the *triarii*. The irregulars having skirmished with the enemy, as the armies approached, they retired gradually between the maniples, and took their station behind the *hastati*, or sometimes behind the *principes*. Here they were in readiness to fall upon the enemy, so soon as they should begin to retreat. But, if the first and second lines were much pressed, and in danger of being repulsed, the *velites* then fell back, and took their post behind the *triarii*. It is owing to their taking either of these stations occasionally, that T. LIVIUS hath posted them behind the *triarii*, and VEGETIUS between the *principes* and *triarii*.

In T. LIVIUS's account of this part of the Legion, there is some obscurity. 'Those,' * says he, 'who composed these
thirty

* Hoc triginta manipulorum agmen Antepilanos appellabant, quia sub signis jam alii quindecim ordines locabantur; ex quibus ordo unusquisque tres partes habebat: Earum unamquamque primum [primam] pilum voca-

thirty maniples were called *antepilani*, for other fifteen divisions were posted behind the ensigns. Each of these fifteen divisions consisted of three parts; and that part which stood before the other two, was called the *pilus*. Each division had three *vexilla*, or ensigns, and one hundred and eighty-six men belonged to these *vexilla*. The first ensign led the *triarii*, all veterans, and of approved bravery. The second led the *rorarii*, who, being younger, had less experience. The third led the *accensi*, a body less trusty than the rest, and, for that reason, thrown in the rear of the whole.

In this passage, it is said, that each division consisted of three parts, and that each of these parts was called the *primus pilus*. But this could not be; for the irregulars, and those who are said in the next sentence to be of the least experience and trust, never made a part of the *primus pilus*, a denomination which belonged only to the *triarii*. The passage becomes plain by the change of one letter, that is, by putting *primam* for *primum*.

It is likewise said in the text, that one hundred and eighty-six men belonged to each *vexillum*. But this is impossible; for

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those

bant. Tribus ex vexillis constabat. Vexillum [vexilla] centum octoginta sex homines erant. Primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militum spectatae virtutis: Secundum rorarios, minus roboris, aetate factisque: Tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae manum, eo et in postremum aciem rejiciebantur.

those who were posted behind the *antepilani* would then amount to upwards of eight thousand men, which is greatly above the complement of the Legion. Though *vexillum* were changed into *vexilla*, as hath been conjectured, so as to make the three parts of each division to consist of one hundred and eighty-six men, this would still exceed the number of the *triarii* and irregulars taken together. There is, therefore, an error in these numbers. But it is highly probable that these *accensi* were supernumeraries, and not included in the muster of the Legion, or were considered as not fighting men. This is presumed, not only from T. LIVIUS's calling them a body of little or no trust *, but from a passage in VEGETIUS. This author agrees with T. LIVIUS in placing them in the rear of the irregulars; and adds, 'they were called *accensi*, as being younger, and afterwards added †.' There is good reason to believe that these *accensi* acted as servants, though not slaves, in the Legion, and that equal portions of them were allotted to the maniples, cohorts, and their officers; and likewise, that they were occupied, in time of action, in supplying the *velites* with stones and other missile weapons. These conjectures are supported by passages from VARRO and other authors ‡. These three bodies,

the

* *Minimae fiduciae manus.*

† *Quos accensos, tanquam juniores et postea additos, nominabant. Lib. iii. cap. xiv.*

‡ *Quid de adscriptivis quum erant attributi decurionibus et centurionibus, qui eorum habent numerum, accensi vocabantur. Varro apud Nonium. Lib. xx.*

the *triarii*, the *rorarii*, or fighting irregulars, of whatever denomination, and the *accensi*, make up the three lines of T. LIVIUS which stood behind the *antepilani*; and the fifteen divisions of each of these lines correspond exactly with the thirty maniples which made up the *hastati* and *principes*, that is, the first and second lines.

It is probable that the *triarii* made the line of the Legion, from which the other four were dressed, whether for action or reviews; so that their *pila* or ensigns were, with propriety, considered as the *signa Legionis*.

Thus, if we except two words, this chapter of T. LIVIUS gives a distinct, accurate, and elegant description of the Legion, and agrees with Vegetius. It hath, indeed, been urged, that

VEGETIUS

Ut consules ac praetores, qui sequuntur in castra, *accensi* dicti, quod ad necessarias res saepius acciantur, velut accersiti. Id. ibid.

Accensos ministratores Cato esse scribit. Potest id ab arbitrio, nam inde ad arbitrium ejus cujus minister. Id. lib. vi. L. L.

Adscripticii, velut quidam adscripti, dicebantur, qui supplendis legionibus adscribebantur. Has et *recensos* dicebant, quod ad legionum censum essent adscripti. Quidam *velatos*, quod veluti inermes sequerentur exercitum. *Fest.*

VEGETIUS describes the Legion as it was in later times, and long after the age of T. LIVIUS. But the account of the *triarii*, and the disposition of the ten cohorts, render it obvious, that VEGETIUS meant to describe the Legion as it was soon after the time of POLYBIUS.

What was the number of the *accensi* in each Legion is nowhere told. If we suppose them to have been about four hundred, that is, in round numbers, thirteen men to each manipule, then would each of the fifteen divisions of the three lines posted behind the *antepilani*, contain an hundred and six men, which might have been, by inattention of transcribers, made or mistaken for one hundred and eighty-six.]

This last conjecture, though not without probability, is not offered as satisfactory, nor doth it much matter in the present inquiry, since it is obvious that T. LIVIUS means no more in this passage, than to mention those parts of the Legion which were posted behind the first and second lines. Besides, the irregulars varied, both in numbers and names, at different periods, as hath been observed; and this inquiry is chiefly intended to ascertain the posts of the ten cohorts, these making the body or active part of the Legion. VEGETIUS is to be understood in this sense, where he says, ‘ * When the armies close, the

* Prima autem et secunda acies, cum ad spathas et ad pilas, uti dicitur, ventum fuerit, totum sustinet bellum. Lib. iii. cap. xiv.

‘ the first and second lines bear the whole stress of the battle.’

It doth not appear, that in POLYBIUS's time, the maniples were either classed in cohorts, or divided into centuries; a circumstance to which LIPSIUS seems not to have attended, and which hath been the cause of his error. For, without advancing any authority whatever, he observes that each line, consisting of ten maniples, could not, with propriety, be divided into cohorts, containing three maniples; since by this division the line would have contained three cohorts, and a single maniple. He concludes, therefore, that the cohort must have been made up of a maniple from each line. But, since two authors, and one of them treating expressly of the Roman militia, agree, that the first and second lines contained, each five complete cohorts or fifteen maniples, it is not to be doubted that the Legion underwent this change after POLYBIUS's time. Further, as VEGETIUS, with remarkable precision, takes notice of the particular station of each cohort, it may be presumed that he did not copy from T. LIVIUS, since this author doth not use the word *cohort*, but only mentions the precise number of maniples requisite to make up five cohorts in each of these two lines. In the times of T. LIVIUS and VEGETIUS, many authors, from whom they had their authorities, were extant, and are now entirely lost.

It might have been expected that LIPSIUS should have satisfied his reader in the following circumstance, viz. Why T. LI-

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VIUS

VIUS makes use of the word *maniple* for the divisions of the first and second lines, but, in giving an account of the third line, never makes use of this term? Had the divisions of this line been named *maniples*, there could be no reason why the author should not have expressed them under their proper denomination in this, as well as in the two preceding lines. The case is, That the whole *maniples* of the Legion, properly so called, (that is thirty), were disposed of in the first and second lines; and, when the Legion came to be thus disposed, the divisions of the *triarii* were neither termed *maniples* nor *cohorts*; nor could this body have been included in the cohorts, without inconvenience; for, when compleat cohorts were detached on duties of fatigue, the *triarii*, being veterans, and having no other duty but to make a stand in the field in cases of extremity, must have been unfit to attend detachments where uncommon fatigue and expedition were necessary.

VEGETIUS says, that, when the Legion consisted of six thousand and one hundred infantry, the first cohort contained eleven hundred and five men, and each of the other nine cohorts five hundred and fifty-five*. This made the complement of the Legion, without the cavalry; and yet, in this computation, the *triarii* are not mentioned; they must, therefore, have belonged to the first cohort; which is the more probable, that this cohort is said to have been the head of the Legion, being made up of men of family, of courage and bodily vigour;

* Lib. II. cap. 6.

gour; so that those of the other cohorts were ambitious of being promoted to this. It is therefore probable that the other nine cohorts were supplied with centurions from the first; and, perhaps, these officers might still continue to belong to the first cohort, though they were occasionally present with their respective centuries; as our general officers are not always present with their regiments, nor field-officers with their respective troops or companies, these being committed to the care of inferior officers. The constant presence of the centurions with their centuries was the less necessary, that a great number of officers of inferior rank belonged to each century; such as the *decani*, or *capita contubernii*, who had the command of ten men; and the *ordinum ductores*, or leaders of files.

If therefore the centurions be allowed to have belonged to the first cohort, its number, when the *triarii* are deducted from it, will be the same with that of each of the other cohorts, that is, five hundred and fifty men: For VEGETIUS makes the centurions of the Legion amount only to fifty-five.

It is remarkable, that, as the Roman historians cease to mention the distinguishing names of the three lines, we begin to meet with the pretorian cohort. It is found in SALLUST, and is once mentioned by CAESAR. Whether the first cohort, including the *triarii*, came afterwards to make the pretorian cohort, is submitted to the judgement of others. The *evocati* seem likewise to have been a remain of the *triarii*; and as the divisions of the *triarii*, after the formation of the cohorts, were no longer

er denominated maniples, neither were the divisions of the *evocati* thus named. This appears from a passage in CAESAR, where CRASTINUS, leading a party of *evocati* to attack the enemy, addresses them thus : " Sequimini me, manipulares mei " *qui fuistis*," &c. CAESAR says, that this body consisted of an hundred and twenty men, and belonged to the same century ; for the lowest divisions of the legion were, in general, termed centuries, without regard to the number they contained. But, though the *evocati* might have been produced from the *triarii*, upon the triple distinction ceasing, it appears, from different passages of the Roman authors, that the general had a select party as a body-guard, before that period.

In POLYBIUS's time, the legion consisted of four thousand and two hundred infantry ; of which number, twelve hundred belonged to the first line, twelve hundred to the second, and the same number was allotted for irregulars, or *velites* ; the remaining six hundred made up the *triarii*. Each of the three lines consisted of ten divisions, or maniples. The maniple in the first and second lines contained one hundred and twenty men, and those of the third line, sixty.

This was the constitution of the Legion in POLYBIUS's time, of which he gives a distinct account. But, afterwards, when the Legion came to be augmented, it was found necessary to have recourse to larger divisions ; and, accordingly, POLYBIUS's divisions were classed in ten cohorts, each consisting of three maniples ; and the six hundred *triarii* seem to have been

been included in the first cohort, as hath been observed, though, when the Legion was in line of battle, the *triarii* were detached from the other part of the cohort, and took their respective posts. The first and second lines were called *antepilani*, or sometimes *antesignani*; the term *antesignanus*, however, hath not always the same meaning. The ensigns of the *triarii* were, by way of distinction, called the *signa* of the Legion; and the maniples or cohorts considered the particular ensign or *pilum* of that division of the *triarii* before which they were posted, as their respective ensign. By attending to this circumstance, many passages in the Roman authors, which have perplexed the commentators, and been the subject of much conjecture, become obvious. Thus, where VEGETIUS mentions the three lines of heavy armed men, as distinguished from the irregulars, or light armed*, the sense is plain, without any change in the text: "But those who fight
 " immediately before and on the other side of, or under the
 " ensigns, and likewise the first line, make the heavy armed
 " troops†." By *dimicantes ante et citra signa* are understood in this passage, the second and third lines, as if it were *ultra et citra*. And T. LIVIUS, after having described the first and second lines, says, other fifteen divisions were placed under the ensigns‡. The same author, in describing SCIPIO AFRICANUS's order of battle, hath a passage which hath been deemed

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* Veget. Lib. II. Cap. 15.

† Sed ante signa et citra signa, nec non etiam in prima acie dimicantes, haec erat gravis armatura.

‡ Hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellabant; quia *sub signis* jam alii quindecim ordines locabantur. Lib. viii. c. 8.

inexplicable: "He drew up," says he, "first the *hastati*, behind these the *principes*: The *triarii* made the rear line: "But he did not place the cohorts in close order, each before its respective ensign, but the maniples at a moderate distance from one another*." "I do not understand," says SALMASIUS, "what is meant by placing the cohorts each before its respective ensign. It was not a custom," says he, "either in the ancient or later militia, for the maniples or cohorts to stand before their ensigns, but constantly behind them." It is true, the maniples had small ensigns, which they carried near their front: But the *signa* here meant are the *pila*, which T. LIVIUS, in effect, explains soon after, where he says, *nec pila ab antesignanis cessabant*. Afterwards, when there were no *triarii* in the Legion, by *post signa* is understood a station behind or in the rear of the Legion; thus LUCAN, speaking of CAESAR'S disposition, "*tenet obliquas post signa cohortes*." The posts before the ensigns, possessed by the *antepilani*, were considered as less honourable than that of the *triarii*, who were said to be *sub signis*, or *citra signa*. These expressions are to be understood in the same sense as sailors with us say, before or behind the mast.

This constitution of the Legion, described by T. LIVIUS and VEGETIUS, though it was the most perfect and useful, it seems
not

* Instruit deinde primos hastatos, post eos principes; triariis postremam aciem claudit, non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quamque signa instruebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes.

not to have been of long duration : For it doth not appear that the distinction of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*, was continued beyond the time of C. MARIUS ; the officers, however, retained their names from these divisions, as *primus pilus*, *primus hastatus*, *primus princeps*, &c. In JULIUS CAESAR's time, the ten cohorts of the Legion were considered as on an equal footing, or nearly so, and were thrown into different forms indiscriminately, like the different batalions of the same brigade with us. Thus CAESAR, in making a disposition against PETREIUS and AFRANIUS in Spain, ordered his front line to consist of four cohorts of each Legion ; and the remaining six cohorts of the respective Legions to be equally divided between the second and third lines * : And, when he drew his army near these two generals at ILERDA †, he ordered the first and second lines to stand in order of battle, while the third line was employed in making a ditch and rampart behind them ; a work which would have ill suited the dignity of the *triarii*.

Perhaps, however, the third line, of whatever cohorts it was composed, was still considered as a body of reserve : For, at PHARSALIA, the third line was ordered to wait a signal peculiar to itself ; which signal was not given till the enemy had begun to retire : And, in the action with the *Swiss*, the third line was sent to support the first and second, when they were brought into some danger in the pursuit.

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* See Plate III. † Now Lerida, in Spain.

It is surprising that one so well informed in Roman antiquities as Salmasius, should have asserted that maniples were the only divisions of the Legion, during the whole time of the republic *. It appears, from many passages, in different authors, that cohorts were formed several years before the commencement of the imperial state. SALLUST says, that CATILINE was able to form two Legions, the cohorts of which he made up according to the number of soldiers he could collect: Nor doth the author mention the cohort as a new division of that time †. The indiscriminate use of the word *cohort*, to express any body of men, renders it difficult to ascertain when that division was introduced. SALMASIUS's assertion, that *ordo* and *manipulus* were the same, during the republican state, is no less a mistake.

It is not improbable, that, when a Legion was much weakened, the number of cohorts was diminished till the Legion should be recruited: So that, in mentioning the strength of an army, it is more accurate to tell the number of cohorts, than the number of Legions; as we mention the strength of an army rather
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* Certum praeterea est, aetate Polybii, et omnibus saeculis liberae reipublicae, ordines et manipulos eosdem fuisse in militia Romana. Manipulatim quippe ordinabantur acies toto illo tempore quo respublica floruit. Ideo ordines et manipuli iidem.

† Catilina ex omni copia quam ipse adduxerat, et Manlius habuerat, duas legiones instituit; cohortes pro numero militum complet, &c.

by battalions, than by brigades. CAESAR, mentioning his muster at PHARSALIA, says, his army consisted of eighty cohorts ; and observes, that the eighth and ninth legions, which made the left of his army, were so weak, that, being posted next to one another for their mutual support, they had the appearance of one legion. He observes, further, that POMPEY was able to muster an hundred and ten cohorts ; and that his Cilician legion was supported with some cohorts, lately come from Spain.

But, though the number of the cohorts in a Legion might have been occasionally reduced, it is evident that the cohorts themselves were frequently different, with respect to strength: For the number of men in CAESAR's army was not one half of that of his enemy, and yet the number of his cohorts was to that of POMPEY's in a much higher proportion; consequently CAESAR's cohort must have been considerably weaker.

Upon the whole, it appears evident, that the form of the Roman army underwent different changes, at different periods of the state; its disposition being, at first, a continued line, and in close order, like the Macedonian *phalanx*. T. LIVIUS is, perhaps, the only author who asserts this. It is said, by other authors, that ROMULUS divided the legion into maniples. Notwithstanding this, the Legion might be disposed in the field, in continued lines, and without intervals. Classes of one kind or other, under respective officers, were necessary for the sake of

order and convenience in the camp, and in quarters. The Greek *phalanx* was likewise divided into classes for this purpose, as LIPSIUS hath justly observed. Afterwards, the Legion consisted of thirty maniples, disposed equally in three lines*; these of the third line containing but one half the number of men that were in each of the other two. When the Legion became larger, it was divided into ten cohorts, disposed in the first and second lines, the *triarii* being detached, probably, from the first cohort to the rear, as a body of reserve. At length, the distinction of *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii* ceasing, the ten cohorts of the Legion seem to have been equally employed in duty, excepting the first, which still retained a preference, and was perhaps more numerous.

In reading the classical authors, particularly where the battles of the Romans are described, it is necessary to attend to these changes of the Legion: For many of the commentators consider it as having retained always the same constitution, or nearly so: And yet it doth not appear, that, at any period, the three maniples of each cohort were disposed in the three different lines, as LIPSIUS would have them, and as hath been generally believed upon his authority. At the battle of PHARSALIA, CAESAR drew six compleat cohorts from the third line, which he could not have done, had a maniple of each cohort been posted in each of the three lines. LIPSIUS, sensible how much this passage makes against his disposition of the Legion, would

would correct CAESAR's expression, *ex tertia acie*, by *externa acie*. But, besides, that CAESAR seldom makes use of words called by grammarians *distributives*, he had two good reasons for drawing these cohorts from the third line, rather than from any of the other two. One was, that the first and second lines were to bear the weight of the battle, the third line being ordered not to move, till they should have a particular signal, which was not given till the enemy's troops were broken, and in flight. The other reason was, that CAESAR found himself in the utmost danger, unless he had made this new disposition very quickly, and the cohorts of the third line were more in readiness than those of the other two; besides the third line, after this deduction, would still consist of about twenty cohorts, which was a good body of reserve.

It may be asked why the Legion came to be changed from a more, to a less perfect state? The reason seems to have been, that, before the empire was greatly extended, the waste of men being less, frequent levies were less necessary, and there would be a greater number of veterans, in proportion to the extent of the armies; consequently, the triple distinction, making the three lines, would be preserved without inconvenience. But, the empire becoming unwieldy, the waste of men, from frequent and long marches, and from the increase of other duties of fatigue, would likewise become greater, the proportion of veterans would of course diminish, and levies would be made with greater difficulty :

difficulty: In consequence of all which, the distinctions in the Legion would wear out. Further, as the fatigues of duty increased, the inactive part of the Legion would become a greater oppression. In an army of thirty thousand men, the *triarri* amounted to three thousand six hundred: These being exempted from the duties of the camp, the fatigues of the rest of the Legion could not fail to be proportionally increased. Besides, it was frequently found necessary to throw the Legion into different forms by an arbitrary arrangement of the cohorts, as the general found it suited his purpose. But it doth not appear that the *triarri* ever mixed with the *antepilani*, being always posted as a body of reserve. In these two respects, that body, however serviceable in particular circumstances, would at length become an incumbrance to the Legion. Those who have attended an army, especially in more active campaigns, must have observed with what alacrity the men discharge their duty, when every part of the army is equally involved in fatigue: And, on the other hand, what dissatisfaction and disgusts arise from one part of the army meeting with greater indulgences in the discharge of duty than another.

When the Legion was in order of battle, the maniples of the preceding line covered the intervals of the following: Thus, *SCIPIO*, at the battle of *ZAMA*, ordered the ordinary disposition of the army to be changed, and the maniples to be posted in right lines from the front to the rear; so that these lines, or, as they are now termed, divisions, having avenues betwixt them, the army, in marching up to the enemy, passed the

the elephants without provoking them : And CAESAR's third line, when engaged in making a ditch and rampart, was concealed from AFRANIUS's army by the two preceeding lines, the maniples of the one line falling in with the intervals of the other.

It hath been an opinion with some modern authors, that the first line of the Legion, when in order of battle, was invariably disposed in close order, and without intervals ; and that, when this line was so much pressed by the enemy as to be under the necessity of retiring, it then divided, and either occupied, or passed through the intervals of the second line*. But, besides that there are evident proofs, particularly from the battle of ZAMA, that this was not the disposition of the first line, more than of the other two, it is sufficiently obvious that an arrangement of this kind would have proved dangerous ; for so great intervals would have been left between the front-line of each Legion, and of that standing next, that a considerable body of the enemy might, with impunity, and on the first attack, penetrate to the second line. When the first cohort came to be considerably augmented, the intervals of the first line would necessarily become proportionally less than those of the other two.

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* Verisimile tamen est, immo et verum, primos hastatorum manipulos juncto agmine pugnasse. Quo enim in illis intervalla et vias, qui nullos intra se recepturi erant? Sed ubi pugnassent conjunctis ordinibus, si cedendum esset impressioni hostis, tum laxatis ordinibus, manipuli singuli ad intervalla principum, quae ad hoc aperta relinquebantur, expectantium eventum pugnae hastatorum, refugiebant. SALMAS.

It is not to be doubted, that the barbarous nations with whom the Romans fought, had their armies disposed in close order, like the Greek *phalanx*; this being always the case before proper military discipline, and regular arrangements of men, be introduced. Hence CAESAR calls the army of the *Helvetii* a *phalanx*. The parts of these armies, therefore, which stood opposite to the intervals of the maniples, would have no regulars opposed to them. But, the Roman irregulars, falling back through the intervals, as the maniples came to close with the enemy, continued to ply them through these openings, with their projectile weapons, which they used with surprising dexterity, as all antiquity informs us. The irregulars, according to T. LIVIUS, were sometimes thrown into these intervals.

The disposition of the Roman cavalry, in line of battle, is commonly represented to have been an oblong and close embodied column, without intervals. But, it doth not appear that the Roman cavalry was disposed in this manner; and the inconveniences unavoidably attending such a column, render it improbable. By fronts so contracted, their armies would have been constantly exposed to be surrounded by their enemies: For, Roman armies being always greatly inferior in numbers to those of their enemies, it was of importance to extend their front as much as possible. Another inconvenience attending this column would have been, that, if it should be thrown into confusion, the respective troops of the Legions could not, without the greatest difficulty, if at all, be brought to order again. Nor is a column, so close as the Roman cavalry hath been hitherto represented, a
disposi-

disposition proper to fall upon, or to pursue an enemy, when broken or put to flight. Another circumstance, which renders this disposition wholly improbable is, that a Roman army, thus constructed, could never surround or fall upon the flank of an enemy: And yet we have it ascertained from different authors, that this was sometimes done.

To mention one circumstance more, and of as great importance as any of the preceeding: The Romans were attentive to nothing more in their military art, than to preserve the order of each line, provided any of the rest should be thrown into disorder. So that, if a Roman army did its duty, it could not suffer a defeat till the enemy had engaged three fresh lines. If then, the first line found itself under the necessity of falling back to the second, or both to the third, the cavalry, in this case, being, on each wing, in an oblong column, closely embodied, would immediately be reduced to the greatest distress, having their front and two long flanks exposed to the enemy; and being unable, without running into confusion, to change their disposition, so as either to relieve themselves, or support the infantry.

Thus it is probable, that the different troops or divisions of cavalry were arranged *turmatim*, as they expressed it, not unlike our own. The cavalry, therefore, of the right wing of a Roman army, consisting of four Legions, would appear, as in plate IV. the number of troops being proportioned to the numbers in each line of infantry, when the *triarii* subsisted.

What

What seems to have misled the commentators is, that, having been little acquainted with the construction of armies, and, having heard that the intention of cavalry was to cover the flanks of the infantry, they therefore thought that an army, though consisting of three lines, and these at a considerable distance from one another, ought to have its flanks covered, from the front to the rear of the three lines, as with an uninterrupted wall. Had these authors been acquainted with the oeconomy of modern armies, this knowledge would have assisted them in explaining many passages relating to the Roman militia, which have either appeared obscure, or wholly unintelligible. We have a striking proof of this in the passage of FRONTINUS quoted above : CNEIUS POMPEIUS *adversus* CAIUM CAESAREM, *Palaeopharsali, triplicem instruxit aciem, quarum singulae habebant denos ordines in latitudinem.* In explaining this passage, JUSTUS LIPSIUS, one of the most celebrated authors of the last century for knowledge in antiquity, is, however, wholly perplexed ; and, after much fruitless conjecture, changing many words of the text, and not once coming near the meaning of the author, he breaks out in the following exclamation : *Alas ! for my uncertainty, or that of ancient customs, which I hunt after by light conjectures, and through paths so deceitful ** After all, the passage, to one moderately acquainted with the order of an army, is obvious, without any change in the author's words. " CNEIUS POMPEIUS against CAIUS CAESAR, at the battle of PHARSALIA, " drew

* Heu meas tenebras, aut rerum veterum ! quas profecto per leves conjecturas et fallacia vestigia venamur.

drew up his army in three lines, each of which consisted of ten ranks. The word *rank* in English, is distinct and definite: But the term *ordo*, being variously applied, it was necessary to say *ordines in latitudinem*; for the number of ranks is reckoned from the front to the rear of an army, that is, according to its breadth or depth, in contradistinction to its length. Hence, *altitudo* or *latitudo*, in this passage, would have had the same meaning, either of the two being sufficient to distinguish it from *longitudo*.

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SECTION II.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

MILITARY ART of the ROMANS.

IN examining the constitution of the Legion, it appears that the Roman militia was free of some inconveniencies to which modern armies, according to the present military systems, are unavoidably subjected. The following examples are among the more obvious.

I. Since the use of fire-arms, it hath been found necessary to extend the lines of an army to a great length. When an action is general, an extensive front is attended with obvious inconveniencies: For a commander in chief, however accomplished, is brought under the disagreeable necessity of trusting more to his inferior officers, than a prudent general would chuse, were it in his power to avoid it. The fate of battles is known to depend frequently on minute circumstances; and
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a small advantage gained by an enemy, if not quickly obviated, soon becomes irreparable : Hence, the danger of depending on verbal messages sent by *aids de camp*. It is for this reason that the most eminent modern generals, particularly PRINCE EUGENE, and the MARISCHAL DE SAXE always preferred an attack of posts to a general action.

With the Romans, the case was different. The three lines of the Legion, taken together, and without reckoning the irregulars, were thirty men deep. Our armies consist commonly of two lines, and each line being three men deep, it follows that the front of a Roman army did not extend beyond one fifth of the front of a modern army consisting of an equal number of men. But further, thirty thousand men were reckoned a great army with the Romans ; with us, sixty thousand are deemed moderate. Modern armies, therefore, taken in general, may be reckoned to extend in front ten times more than those of the Romans. Thus, a Roman general, having the whole action under his eye, was able to support any part of his army where he observed the danger greatest, without depending on his inferior general officers, or having recourse to verbal messages.

2. The character of of a legionary soldier was attended with a considerable degree of dignity. No slave was admitted into the ranks ; and, in a state which abounded with a multiplicity of slaves, a citizen set an high value on his liberty. Hence every
 foldier

soldier acted from the best principle; since, by defending his own liberty, which he rated so high, he necessarily defended that of his country.

In the present times, the case is different, our armies being frequently recruited from the dregs of the people. Armies are now considered as receptacles for men of irregular lives, of dissolute and corrupted manners, and who are reluctant to labour. Such colonels, therefore, or officers, who have the immediate direction of particular regiments, merit the greater applause, the more they are attentive to preserve decency and order in their respective regiments, and in admitting only such men whose manners recommend them. According to the present system, this is difficult: But that it is not impracticable, the author would willingly show from the example of a particular regiment, in the character and good fortune of which he will ever reckon it his duty to consider himself interested. But it would be improper to exemplify this from a single regiment, when so many officers belonging to others in the British army may justly lay claim to equal applause for their attention to regularity and accurate discipline in their respective departments.

3. Another essential advantage which attended the militia of the ancients, was, that every man's safety depended on his art, his courage, and his bodily vigour. With us, a soldier, however well qualified, whether by nature or art, can but little avail

vail himself of these advantages in preserving his life. Bullets from fire-arms level the brave and the coward indiscriminately. A man meets dangers with less reserve and regret, when he hath opportunities of exerting his powers to avert them. But, to be fixed in a station, and to stand there unmoved, as a mark to batteries, for hours together, is too severe a trial of one's courage and temper: And yet, according to the present military system, this is often the case, especially with cavalry. Nor can the slow advances of our infantry, when occupied in the manoeuvre of the musket, be supposed to stimulate the mind so much as the more animated motions of men accustomed to the sword and shield.

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4. An obvious disadvantage attending the modern militia, is the small chance of advancement from a private station. A soldier can seldom entertain hopes of rising beyond the office of a sergeant; and the number of these, and of corporals together, is so small, in proportion to the whole, that it becomes an object of ambition too slender and mean to stimulate the mind. The Legion, in this respect, was much better constituted; for the long course of preferment was a constant spur to the exertion of military merit. The *velites*, or light armed troops, being the lowest part of the legion, made an excellent nursery for the ranks. As it was the business of these troops to skirmish with the enemy before the ranks engaged, it was no small encouragement for them to exert themselves, since they fought in the view of their officers: Nor could these, in their turn, fail to observe when any of the irregulars distinguish-

ed themselves. Thus the officers had it in their power to select from the *velites* those of greatest merit, and to incorporate them in the ranks. In whatever inferior cohort they were inrolled, they immediately became solicitous to be promoted from it to the first, which was an object of laudible ambition, the first cohort being, in many respects, preferable to the rest. Besides this gradation, the Legion abounded with offices of different degrees, as the *ordinum duces*, *decani*, or *capita contubernii*, *tergioduces*, *centuriones*, and *ensign-bearers*, of which last there was a great number in the Legion. In our regiments, the number of offices betwixt a commissioned officer and a private soldier, is not above one twelfth or thirteenth part of the whole. In the Legion, the number of offices from a private soldier to the prefect and tribune, and to which private soldiers had opportunities of rising, was about a fourth or fifth of the whole Legion; and, if with us there is sometimes an example of a private man rising to an high station; so were there among the Romans examples of private men having reached the supreme military power, of which C. MARIUS was a striking example.

5. The methods of attack and defence in use among the moderns, have rendered artillery an indispensable appendage of an army. But, however necessary and useful artillery may be in certain respects, it is a great incumbrance in the movements of an army, in so much that, from this cause alone, enterprizes, the success of which depended on expedition, have frequently been

been rendered abortive. The armies of the ancients, and particularly of the Romans, were better fitted for expedition, not only on account of their smaller numbers, but likewise of their being free from the incumbrance of artillery. Hence we frequently find the ancients engaged in enterprizes which a modern army, clogged with artillery, could not undertake. While CAESAR besieged GERGOVIA *, he was informed that the ÆDUI † had revolted, which was the more alarming, that this people had signalized themselves by their adherence and fidelity to the Romans; and CAESAR, in his turn, had distinguished them with particular marks of favour. He saw that to abandon the siege, and to neglect this revolt, would equally endanger a general defection of the GAULS. Leaving two legions, therefore, to defend the camp, and amuse the besieged, he marched with four legions about midnight, came up with the army of the ÆDUI at the distance of twenty-five miles from his camp, to which he returned before sun-rising the second morning after he had left it. This happened some time near the autumnal equinox, as appears from a passage where CAESAR mentions his crossing the ALLUR. This march, therefore, of fifty miles was performed in less than thirty hours; for he was occupied some time with the enemy, and allowed his men three hours rest before they began

* A town in *Auvergne* near *Clermont* in the *Lionois*. Some remains of *Gergovia* are still to be seen.

† A people who inhabited that part of *Burgundy* called *Autunois*.

began to return. By expedition, he obliged POMPEY and his party to abandon ROME in confusion. By a forced march, he escaped from DYRRACHIUM, and saved his army, his enemy being unable to come up with him, from the greater quantity of baggage. By expedition, he overtook PETREIUS and AFRAANIUS in the mountains of CATALONIA; and, without bloodshed or fighting, having forced them to lay down their arms, put an end to a campaign; which furnisheth, perhaps, greater examples of generalship than any other recorded in history. Upon the whole, an accomplished general will avail himself more of his military qualifications with an army fitted for surprize, feints, forced marches, or whatever enterprizes depend on expedition, than with an army encumbered with the necessary implements of the modern system.

6. It is impossible to ascertain the just proportion of cavalry to the infantry of an army, because the number of cavalry ought to be greater or smaller, as the face of the country, which is the theatre of the war, is plain or mountainous. With the moderns, the proportion of horse to foot is, from one sixth to one third of the whole army; though there are examples of the cavalry rising above the one, and falling below the other.

The Romans had always a small proportion of cavalry; and that was ascertained by law. The mean proportion was, as one
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to seventeen, or something more; that is, the cavalry of a Roman army made betwixt a seventeenth and eighteenth part of the whole army. Whether this small proportion was always convenient, may be doubted: But, by attending to some circumstances in their militia, it will appear to have been necessary. In encampments, cavalry occupy a much greater extent of ground, in proportion to their numbers, than infantry. It was a matter of importance to the Romans to have their camps as much contracted as possible, that they might be able to fortify and defend them with greater ease. When they changed their camps frequently, these fortifications became very laborious; their ramparts and ditches being, for the most part, large*. It may be observed further, that it was sometimes in the power of an enemy to invest their camps, and to lay the adjacent country so far waste, that it became difficult, if not impossible, to find forage. But, besides these reasons for a small proportion of horse, it doth not appear that the Romans ever put great confidence in them, or were duly attentive to the discipline of cavalry.

When the Roman army under *SCIPIO* was defeated by *HANNIBAL*, soon after that General had made a descent upon *ITALY*, *SCIPIO* declared, that the merit of the Gaulic and Numidian cavalry exceeded that of the Roman so far, that they had it in their power, at any time, to dismantle the flanks of the Roman infantry, and thus to render it impossible for these to

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* *Caesar de bell. Gall. Lib. II. Cap. 5.*

avail themselves of their more excellent discipline. Unless, therefore, a Roman army, in that war, could have been posted so advantageously, as to have the cavalry of both wings secured from an attack, it could hardly expect ever to vanquish a Carthaginian army. It is easy to judge that a General so highly qualified as HANNIBAL would be particularly attentive to this advantage. Nor do the Romans seem to have greatly improved the discipline of their cavalry in later times, as appears from the following case.

POMPEY, during the civil war, had a greater proportion of cavalry than was usual in those times. At the last decisive action, which furnisheth so many curious circumstances relating to the Roman militia, that General, finding the right of his army secured by a river from an attack, drew his whole cavalry to the left wing. By this disposition, out-flanking his enemy, he intended to overpower his right wing, and to pursue that advantage. But this great body of cavalry was quickly routed by six cohorts, though the number of men in CAESAR's cohorts, at that time, did not exceed one half of the legal establishment. From this example, there is reason to believe that the discipline of the Roman cavalry was not excellent even in the last period of the republic; nor did they trust so much to their own as to the German, Gaulic, and Numidian horse, when they got these into their army.

One circumstance which rendered a numerous body of cavalry less necessary to a Roman army, was their superiority
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in the discipline of their infantry over that of all other nations in those times. By this advantage they were enabled to dispense with the support of much cavalry. Thus, a Roman army, having a small proportion of horse, was free from the inconveniencies of providing large magazines of forage, or of having these seized or burnt by the enemy; circumstances which have been found either to retard the motions of modern armies, or sometimes to render the operations of a campaign fruitless.

7. The motives which induce soldiers to expose themselves to the dangers of war, are among the most important circumstances in this estimate. At present, unless a soldier be actuated by a principle of honour, of patriotism, or of resentment against his enemy, he will not consider himself as greatly interested whether he be on the losing or gaining side. If the army, to which he belongs, hath suffered a defeat, neither he nor his family, if he hath one, are in a much worse state than they had been before this misfortune; he receives his pay now as well as then. If he fall into the enemy's hands, he is sent into their country, or into some garrison, where he is maintained till an exchange of prisoners, which frequently doth not happen till the end of the war. During his captivity, he is free from the dangers of war, to which those who had escaped the enemy are exposed. When the war is over, or when he is exchanged, he is restored to his country, incorporated in his regiment, and intitled to all the privileges of a soldier.

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In ancient times, the condition of a foldier was wholly different. A battle frequently determined the fate of a nation. The subverſion of a government and ſlavery to the citizens, or at leaſt to their army, was no uncommon conſequence of a ſingle defeat. A foldier, therefore, in thoſe times, fought not only for his life, but to ſave his country, friends, or family, from perdition. Theſe incitements, joined with their mode of fighting, rendered their battles obſtinate, deſperate, and, for the moſt part, deciſive. CAESAR obſerves, that, in his action with the *Helvetii*, his legions fought from one o'clock afternoon till the evening, without ſeeing the back of an enemy. A Roman army, under an ambitious and enterprizing general, was frequently led into the heart of an enemy's country, and every man in the army knowing that a defeat would be followed with certain ruin to the whole, naturally concluded, that it was more eligible to die in the field than to fall into the hands of an enemy from whom he had no reaſon to hope for mercy. This was the fate of REGULUS with the Carthaginians, of CRASSUS in Parthia, and of VARUS in Germany. The general political ſyſtem of the ancients having been ſo different from that of the moderns, rendered the effects of war likewise different. With us, war is tedious, expenſive, and its influence, or conſequences are ſeldom ſo much felt by particular ſtates, as to make any remarkable impreſſion on the general ſyſtem of nations who cultivate a political intercourſe with one another. War, at preſent, is leſs dreaded than formerly, not only for the reaſons already aſſigned, but from a conſciouſneſs, that, in order to preſerve a balance among the ſeveral ſtates, a combination

nation is generally formed to check or depress a rising power. The war of the Confederates in Queen Ann's reign, that of the late King George in Flanders, and the last war in Germany, taken together, were upwards of twenty years duration; and yet, at the end of each of these wars, or of all of them, the political system of Europe did not undergo any remarkable change; the same nations subsist now as before, and each state considers itself at present as no less free and independent of the rest, than at the beginning of these wars.

With the ancients, war was rapid, violent, and seldom terminated without the destruction of some nation. JULIUS CAESAR, in the space of five years, conquered Switzerland, all the nations who then inhabited France and the Netherlands, part of Germany and of England; and, in that time, the greater part of these nations were rendered tributaries to Rome. In those times, war was no sooner declared, than a General was invested with ample powers, and acted without controul. With us, the intrigues of courts are interwoven with the operations of war. Some of the most celebrated modern Generals have found their motions retarded or interrupted, and their best digested measures disconcerted, by the caprice of ministers, and the machinations of courts.

8. Of what importance it is to a General to be esteemed by the men whom he commands, is best known to those who have been conversant in armies. If soldiers despise their General, however pertinent his orders may be, they will be obeyed

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with reluctance, if not treated with contempt and ridicule. Our modern generals seldom carry their acquaintance beyond their inferior general and field officers; and of many of these they have but a superficial knowledge. A General, when in the field, commonly hath his quarters at some distance behind his army, is personally known only to a few, and is seldom seen by the inferior part of his army, with whom his character is more or less favourable, as they who represent it are affected. These inconveniencies, from our unwieldy armies, and extensive camps, are unavoidable. A Roman General had many advantages in this respect, not only from the smallness of their armies, but from the form of their encampments, which afforded constant opportunities of procuring the esteem and affection of the officers and foldiers. The Roman camps being of a square form, and their tents compactly arranged, their armies, which seldom exceeded thirty thousand men, occupied but a moderate extent of ground; so that a General could, with ease, and by way of recreation, visit all the lines or streets of his camp, frequently in the space of a day, and could pass from his own tent to any part of the camp in a few minutes. A General, therefore, of prudence, and of happy and humane dispositions, by being frequently present with the men in overseeing the works, and occasionally mixing with them in conversation, could not fail to ingratiate himself with them; and thus had the best opportunities of supporting his character with his army, independent of the representations of others. The great families of ROME sedulously taught their sons a courteous and obliging behaviour to the citizens, in so much that it was a boast among
young

young men of rank, who should be able to salute the greatest number of citizens by name, and without the assistance of a nomenclator. Something of the same nature obtained in the armies, though, perhaps with somewhat more reserve; since it is particularly necessary, in the military life, to temper familiarity and complaisance with dignity.

The Roman armies being frequently at a great distance from their own country, and in the midst of their enemies, a consciousness of the common danger, and of their dependence upon one another for safety, may be supposed to have increased the mutual affections of the whole, from the General downwards: For, among mankind, the bond of friendship becomes stronger as the danger to which they are jointly exposed increaseth.

Of the various beauties with which the commentaries of J. CAESAR abound, none are more striking than the passages which discover the affection which subsisted betwixt that General and his army. He never loseth an opportunity of mentioning the merits, either of his army in general, or of particular characters; and never expresseth himself more pathetically than on these occasions. Indeed, he sometimes ascribes his victories rather to the bravery of his army, than to his own conduct. Numberless instances of CAESAR's solicitude to do justice to his army might be produced; the few following, from his account of the battle of PHARSALIA, may suffice.

The

The first relates to their attention to discipline, independent of orders. Upon founding the charge, the men, as was usual, rushed forwards : But, observing the enemy, contrary to custom, not to stir from their ground, they, of their own accord, stopt, lest they should be fatigued before closing with the enemy, and likewise to be satisfied that the ranks were not in disorder. After a sufficient pause, they made their attack *. To a superficial reader, this will appear a trifling circumstance ; but it was a certain proof of attention to discipline, and CAESAR takes notice of it as such. POMPEY is said too to have been alarmed upon observing it.

CAESAR next observes the readiness of his army to undertake any labour at his desire. The enemy being in flight, CAESAR proposed to his army to force their camp, and observes, that, though the men were exhausted with fatigue and heat, (it being about mid-day), yet, being prepared for any hardship, they complied with the order †.

He

* Sed nostri milites, dato signo, quum infestis pilis procucurrissent atque animadvertissent non concurrere a Pompeianis, usu periti, et superioribus pugnibus exercitati, sua sponte cursum represserunt, et ad medium fere spatium constiterunt, ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent, parvoque intermisso temporis spatio, ac rursus renovato cursu, pila miserunt.

† *Caesar, Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsi, nullum spatium perterritis dari oportere aestimans, milites cohortatus est, ut beneficio fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent :* Qui, etsi magno aestu fatigati, (nam

He afterwards discovers a generous resentment, because of a reproach thrown upon his army. When the enemy's camp was forced, marks of effeminacy and luxury appeared in every part of it; and yet, says CAESAR, they reproached with these vices an army which, with unrelenting patience, and in want of the common necessities of life, had not declined to suffer the greatest hardships *. Upon the whole, CAESAR seldom mentions his army, without discovering the feelings of a grateful and generous mind; and, though emotions of this nature be frequently productive of inflated and hyperbolical language, he never departs from the stile peculiar to himself, which is grave, perspicuous, and nervous. The majesty of his composition corresponds with that of his manners. T. LIVIUS, TACITUS, and SALLUST, have their respective merits: But, in the first of these, declamation and high wrought descriptions weaken the credit of the historian. The abrupt manner of TACITUS occasions a degree of obscurity, which frequently obligeth his reader to exert that attention, which the historian, as well as the poet ought to attract; and SAL-

M

LUST

ad meridiem res erat perducta), tamen, ad omnem laborem animo parati, imperio paruerunt.

* In castris Pompeii videre licuit triclinia strata, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus cespitibus tabernacula constrata, L. etiam Lentuli, et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaque praeterea, quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent: Ut facile aestimari posset, nihil eos de eventu ejus diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirerent voluptates. At hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitui Caesaris luxuriam objiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent.

LUST hath been blamed for affectation in his Archaifms. Amidst the elegancies of these three authors, we can discover a solicitude to please their readers ; which exertion, tho' it ought not to offend the reader, is better concealed than seen. CAESAR, whether in the character of an author, a statesman, a soldier, or a friend, appears constantly with the dignity, ease, and carelessness of the hero and the gentleman. But, while we admire his extraordinary qualifications, we regret that they should have been tarnished with ungovernable ambition.

As no General set an higher value on the lives of his soldiers, so none was ever possessed of the art of acquiring victory with the loss of so few. At the action so often mentioned, when the armies were ready to engage, CAESAR, having observed his enemies disposition, made a speedy change in his own ; and, by a judicious arrangement of fifteen hundred men, gained an easy victory, which, without this presence of mind, must either have been attended with very great loss, or, which is more probable, he must have been totally ruined. With such an army, under such a general, it is not surprising that their conquests were so extensive, their progress so rapid, and their success so uninterrupted.

The quotations requisite to illustrate this inquiry, next to those from the three authors mentioned in the beginning, have been taken from CAESAR preferably to any other author, as well upon the account of the distinguished military character of that great man, as of the credit due to his admired work. To conclude with a celebrated author, " The Memoirs of JULIUS CAESAR will ever remain the best and brightest exemplar, " not only of true generalship, but of fine writing*."

PLATE

P L A T E I.

The Legion as it was in POLYBIUS's time, consisting of three lines, and each line of ten divisions, or maniples.

P L A T E II.

The Legion, as described by T. LIVIUS and VEGETIUS, the maniples being classed in cohorts, and divided into centuries.

I. The *Hastati*.

II. The *Principes*. Each of these lines contained five cohorts, fifteen maniples, and thirty centuries. These two lines were named *antepilani*.

III. The *Triarii*, consisting of ten divisions in POLYBIUS's time, and of fifteen afterwards.

IV. and V. The Irregulars posted according to T. LIVIUS in two lines behind the *triarii*, and according to VEGETIUS, in three lines before them : They were in general named *velites*, or *levis armatura*, and comprehended the *sagittarii*, *funditores*, *jaculatores*, or *ferentarii*, *carroballistae*, *manubalistarii*, *fundibulatores*, and, in general, *rorarii*, and *accensi*.

P L A T E

P L A T E III.

The Legion, after the distinction of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* had ceased; the ten cohorts being then disposed as Generals found it suit their purposes. This example shews one of CAESAR's dispositions. These three plates exhibit the different constitutions of the Legion in three different periods of the Empire.

P L A T E IV.

The cavalry of the right wing of a Roman army consisting of four Legions: The number of squadrons in each line being proportioned to the number of infantry in the same line, and having the first and sixth cohorts, and the three right divisions of the *triarii*, on their left flank. 20 AU 66



PLATE III

The first of the series of plates is a plan of the site of the fort, showing the position of the walls, the ditch, and the various buildings and structures which were found on the site.



The second of the series of plates is a plan of the site of the fort, showing the position of the walls, the ditch, and the various buildings and structures which were found on the site.

PLATE IV

The third of the series of plates is a plan of the site of the fort, showing the position of the walls, the ditch, and the various buildings and structures which were found on the site.



Scale of Feet






Plate I.



Scale of Roman Feet



III

IV

V

Scale of Roman Weights.

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
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

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
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


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II








Scale of Roman feet




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Scale of
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Plate IV.



Scale of Roman Feet
0 150 200 250 300 350